The importance of understanding the effects on vironment, though they would also influence trade trade flows due to sanitary and phytosanitary reg-flows. ulations has grown in recent years as the number of As a case in point, some members of the Eurothese non-tariff barriers have increased while the pean Union (Germany, Italy, and Spain) presently number and level of tariffs have declined. The restrict to 80 parts per million the level of maleic translation of environmental and product safety hydrazide (MH) in domestic and foreign cigarettes concerns into regulation has occurred for two cen-(Yelverton). This affects almost exclusively U.S. tral reasons (Kinsey and Houck): in part there has tobacco, which taken alone exceeds this limit on been an increasing demand for environmental and average (Sheets et al.) . MH is a systemic cellhealth protection associated with rising incomes; division inhibitor that raises tobacco leaf quality and scientific advances have improved the ability through the control of nutrient depletion due to to detect threats to safety (Sheldon and von Wit-lateral branching. Mechanization of U.S. produczke). Yet the suppression of trade protectionism is tion has made substitutes to MH, such as hand also a widely held objective and there is an increas-removal and use of fatty alcohols, relatively less ing anxiety over trade effects as provisions for en-profitable. Future harmonization or expanded vironmental issues and food safety have been adoption of EU phytosanitary regulations, which added to the General Agreement on Tariffs and would amplify the trade effect of MH restrictions, Trade (GATT) and the North American Free Trade appear to be legal under GATT (e.g., GATT SecAgreement (NAFTA) (e.g., USDA, 1994) . These retariat) and generally in the spirit of other interprovisions allow for the establishment of rules os-national agreements, such as NAFTA (Forsythe tensibly designed to protect consumers and the en-and Lynch). MH restrictions do not explicitly discriminate between domestic and foreign produc-duction methods, no limit on MH residues is nec-trade flows. The paper stresses two contributions: essary (USDA, 1979) . to the analysis of trade effects of phytosanitary Maleic hydrazide restrictions make a particu-rules regarding chemical residues generally, and to larly interesting case in the study of the influence the understanding of the tobacco case in particular. of phytosanitary regulations on agricultural trade The analysis focusses on input/output market linkflows: the chemical is associated only with an im-ages and on the substitution away from the residueported input that has close domestic and foreign contaminated U.S. input to residue-free non-U.S. substitutes, but the regulation and monitoring are inputs. This induced substitution results in higher applied to an imported and domestically-produced costs, lower quantity supplied of the final product, output; and both inputs and outputs are traded.' anrettes in Europe. Furthermore, most U.S. tobacco is grown under a An important point to emphasize is that crossgovernment-sponsored cartel raising prices by lim-price effects lead to higher quantities of EU cigaiting output. This issue can be cast in the broader rettes sold and a corresponding increase in the use context of minimum quality standards in interna-of all inputs, including U.S. tobacco. In addition, tional trade. Although the standards are nontariff when the U.S. tobacco price is allowed to fall ditrade barriers their welfare effects can be ambigu-rect price effects stimulate the EU derived demand ous because terms-of-trade effects can increase for U.S. tobacco. These results imply that, alwelfare (Chambers and Pick). Hence empirical in-though the regulation is protectionist in the output vestigation of the impact of the standards is impor-market, it leads to increased EU imports of the tant to determine losers and gainers. One addition input which is the cause of the regulation in the to the literature made here is elucidation of a spe-first place. Furthermore, when the price of U.S. cific case of quality standards: the EU regulation of tobacco adjusts, the regulation is actually antipromaleic hydrazide residue on tobacco products. The tective for EU growers. The regulation also idianalysis also fills in a gap in the literature by ad-rectly influences production practices of U.S. todressing the effect of an output standard on derived bacco growers and leads to lower levels of MH demand.
residues on U.S. leaf. The MH case provides an example of the imThe paper is organized as follows: The first secportance of taking into account the interdepen-tion outlines the general effects of a residue regudence between agriculture production and manu-lation when the regulation is associated with a parfacturing. In 1991, U.S. tobacco shipments to Eu-ticular input having close substitutes. These effects rope were over 26 percent of domestic production, can be separated into the effects on manufacturers over 40 percent of its total exports, comprising 105 of the final product and the effects on the suppliers and 64 million pounds of flue-cured and burley of the input in question. The second section preleaf. Almost 28 percent (49,617 million pieces) of sents a model of tobacco trade and cigarette man-U.S. cigarette exports went to the EU representing ufacture, and discusses its practical implementa-26 million pounds of flue-cured and 22 million tion by use of a displacement model of proportionpounds of burley (Creek, Capehart, and Grise) . ate changes in endogenous variables due to shifts This implies that 77 percent of U.S. tobacco going in exogenous variables. The third section gives the to Europe is imported as unmanufactured leaf and results of simulations and discusses their implica-23 percent arrives in the form of cigarettes. At tions. The paper ends with a concluding section. least two derived demands-for the residuecontaminated and residue-free inputs-and two supply curves-the domestically and foreign pro-Modeling Residue Regulations duced outputs-would be affected by regulation. Moreover, at current usage rates an EU-wide adoption of the 80 ppm standard would not directly Before turning to the analysis of the influence of a affect the demand for U.S. unmanufactured to-residue restriction, a brief discussion of tobacco bacco imports. It would, however, affect cigarette manufacture is warranted. Cigarette production inimports because of compliance costs faced by U.S. volves the blending of flue-cured, burley, and orimanufacturers, who use a greater proportion of ental tobacco types, establishing flavor character-U.S. leaf; and thus it would indirectly increase EU istics. Within each major type there is also a range aggregate tobacco leaf demand, of quality correlated with production region. DeThis paper presents simulations of the effects of sired blend characteristics can be achieved both by tightening the EU regulation on the tobacco grow-mixing types and by mixing qualities of a given ing and manufacturing industries by analyzing its type. Manufacturers differentiate blends by mixing influence on production costs, factor demands, and leaf from different areas of the world. Beyond to- . The ray passing The introduction of a residue regulation associ-through point A is the initial expansion path withated with a particular input gives incentives to out regulation. The ray passing through point B is manufacturers to substitute away from inputs with the expansion path resulting from compliance with high residue levels to those with lower or no res-a regulation of no more than R ppm. Compliance idues. This substitution moves manufacturers leads to a unit cost increase from C O to Cl and away from the cost minimizing choice of inputs in clearly this increase depends upon the substitutthe absence of the regulation, and unit costs in-ability of the inputs. With perfect substitutes, comcrease under compliance.
pliance is merely a move along a linear isoquant This result can be seen by examining in Figure 1 implying no cost increases. With fixed proportions the unit isoquant of constant returns to scale pro-the regulation could not be met, costs of continued duction using two essential inputs, Ti and T2, in a production would be infinite, and the manufacturer blending process. The horizontal axis measures the would retire from the regulated market. amount of use of the residue-contaminated input, For cigarette manufacturers producing a tobacco Tl, which has a fixed residue level of y ppm (this blend, either of these extremes is unlikely. Manuis generalized to endogenous residues below), and facturers place a premium on maintaining blend the vertical axis measures a residue-free input, T2. characteristics (Beghin and Chang) suggesting imThe total residue level in the final product is given perfect input substitutability. Beghin and Chang, and Sumner and Alston have shown that tobaccos are not combined in fixed proportions. The closer an industry is to fixed proportions the more costly T2 is regulation compliance and the more likely regulation is to affect the price and quantity demanded of the final product. The effect on U.S. tobacco growers is compli-T2/T1 = f(-R)/R cated by an output-limiting, price-enhancing goveminment-sponsored cartel. An EU residue regulation shifts the demand to curve D 1 . Two cases are considered: one maintains the program price constant; and the other maintains the price of the competing cigarette, Pc, prices of a constant quota level. To maintain the initial other goods Po, and consumers' disposable inprice, production limits are reduced to Ql. Grow-come, Y. ers adjust their production practices in response to
The total amount of U.S. tobacco for the manthe new output level, resulting in a new residue ufacture of cigarettes consumed in Europe equals level of yl and a new marginal cost curve, the demand of EU and U.S. manufacturers (i.e. MC (,yl) . An altered marginal cost of production TIE + TlU). In equilibrium, the total U.S. to-MC' determines a new quota lease rate, Lt = P°bacco supply, which equals the established quota -MC'. Figure 2 also shows the effects of allow-level (QT1), is the sum of that consumed for EUing the price to adjust to the new demand condi-destined cigarettes and the amount demanded by tions while quota levels remain constant. The mar-other users of U.S. tobacco (Tl°). Endogenous ket price must fall to P'. Because quota levels do and exogenous variables described above are listed not change, there is no shift in marginal costs, and defined in Tables 2 and 3. In the simulations although the lease rate decreases to L 2 = PIwhich follow, we consider two cases of adjustment MC°.
of the U.S. tobacco program. In the first case, the To generalize this discussion, consider the fol-price of U.S. tobacco is held constant by adjustlowing algebraic model, summarized in Table 1 , ments to the quota levels. In the second case, the which allows a parametric approximation of inter-quota is held fixed and the price of U.S. tobacco national tobacco and cigarette markets. Let vari-adjusts. These two cases represent two polar cases able T1 represent U.S. tobacco and the variable T2 of possible policy response to decreases in derepresent other residue-free tobaccos used by both mand. Any intermediate policy that adjusts both EU and U.S. cigarette manufacturers producing quota and price would be bounded by the two cases outputs QC (where i = E, U representing Europe described. and the United States). The EU and U.S. cigarette supplies, SC, depend on their own-price, PC the price of U.S. tobacco inputs, Pr., the composite types of cigarettes depend on the own-price, PC, P
The EU and U.S. prices of non-U.S. tobacco K' EU and U.S. aggregates of non-tobacco inputs used in cigarette production
The use of 10 percent cost share is the result of discussions with PK A price index for the aggregate non-tobacco inputs industry experts and the examination of cost shares used by Sumner and Alston and Beghin and Chang.
*where i = E, U. The cost share of non-U.S. tobacco in EU cigarette tobacco blends 0.80
Wo2
The marginal product of non-U.S. tobacco in EU cigarette tobacco blends 0.80
O2--2
The difference in the restricted cost share and the input contribution 0.05 cZt The cost share of the tobacco blend in the EU and U.S. cigarettes 0.10
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The ratio of the U.S. market price for tobacco to the EU price inclusive of tariffs 0.94
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The change in marginal cost of MH residues as MH residue increases 1*10-10
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The change in marginal cost of output as MH residue increases -1*10-1
Prr
The change in marginal cost of output as output increases 1.48*10 -8 erUi The elasticity of supply of U.S. tobacco growers at current quota levels 10 *where i = E, U.
Simulations of Tobacco and Cigarette Trade
U.S. cigarettes is set at 0.20. 2 The supply elasticity of U.S. tobacco is thought to be relatively large Initial parameters to calibrate the model represent-at current quota levels, and following Babcock and ing current conditions derive from previously-Foster, it is set at 10. Finally, an estimate of the estimated demand-and production-related elastic-divergence between the marginal rate of technical ities, calculated cost shares, and consensus expert substitution and the price ratios of the tobacco inopinion. From this basis, we simulate the effects of puts of the tobacco blend, associated with the a 10 percent decrease in the allowable residue rate forced substitution away from the inputs containlimited by the EU phytosanitary MH regulation. ing residues, is set at 0.05 and increased for the We also carry out sensitivity analyses by varying simulations. Table 4 lists the parameters, a brief price elasticities and cost parameters and identify-definition, and their original values. ing their influence on the effects of decreasing the Over the period 1987 to 1991, on average the allowable residue rate. These results are summa-MH residue regulation of 80 ppm is nonbinding for rized at the end of the section.
EU producers. For example, U.S. flue-cured and For the simulations the cost share of the tobacco blend in cigarettes is taken to be 10 percent for both EU and U.S. manufacturers.l The derived 2 Brown estimates the European demand for U.S. cigarettes to be demand elasticity of the tobacco blends is set at -0.84. This estimate is lower than other estimates used in the literature -2.0 also for both manufacturers, and this param-(e.g. Sumner and Alston and Sumner and Wohlgenant) and thus the estimate of -0.85 is increased in absolute value during the simulations.
eter is increased in the sensitivity analysis. The The demand elasticity of the EU cigarette is set at -0.5 which is a demand elasticity for U.S. cigarettes is initially mid-range estimate of many cigarette demand elasticities reported in beat -, an fr EU c etts Brown. Although, Brown finds the cross-price elasticity between U.S.
taken to be at -0.85, and for EU cigarettes and EU cigarette to be not statistically different from zero, it is initially -0.60. The cross-price elasticity of both EU and set here at the low level of 0.2.
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burley made up only 26 percent of tobacco used by Due to their use of a relatively high proportion German manufacturers. Given an average residue of residue-free tobacco, in the fixed price scenario, level of 145 ppm, which errs on the high side, the EU manufacturers are affected only through the U.S. share results in less than 38 ppm MH residue cross-price elasticity of EU cigarette demand. As for the whole tobacco blend, half of the regulated the U.S. cigarette price increases due to complilimit. Average use of U.S. tobacco over the same ance with a stricter MH regulation, the demand for five years was 17 percent for Dutch manufacturers, the EU cigarette increases as well. Given constant 6 percent for Italian, and 6 percent for British. At returs to scale, EU manufacturers meet this dethese usage rates an EU-wide adoption of the 80 mand by increasing output and inputs in equal proppm regulation with not affect EU demand for portions. Per unit production costs and the EUcig-U.S. tobacco. Even at an exaggerated rate of 25 arette price remain unchanged. For U.S. manufacpercent of U.S. tobacco in EU blends, the average turers, however, costs increase as input combina-MH residues would have to be 320 ppm to make tions change to meet stricter residue requirements. the limit binding, 50 percent higher than the high-In the fixed quota scenario, the price of U.S. toest residue crop average recorded.
3 For U.S. man-bacco falls which stimulates the EU use of U.S. ufacturers, tobacco blends contain approximately tobacco and decreases the price of EU cigarettes 35 percent U.S. grown flue-cured and 30 percent leading to an additional feedback effect on the de-U.S. grown burley. 4 At the 1991 residue levels of mand for U.S. cigarettes and a negative substitu 145 ppm on flue-cured and 100 ppm on burley, the tion effect on EU grown tobacco. MH residue for U.S. manufactured cigarettes is Table 5 presents the algebraic representations of approximately 81 ppm, making the EU standard the percentage changes of all the endogenous varislightly binding. 5 ables given some percentage decrease, ER, in the In order to simulate the effect of the MH regu-regulated MH level. Table 6 presents the numer lation on the trade flows of tobacco and cigarettes, ical results of simulating a 10 percent decrease in further structure is added to the general model out-the MH constraint for endogenous variables. lined above. Blended tobacco is taken to be an We first discuss the results for the fixed price intermediate output in the production of cigarettes scenario (column I of table 6). The results show subject to a constant elasticity of substitution that an EU-wide adoption of more restrictive MH (CES) production process using residue-contami-regulations could lower the demand for U.S. tonated and residue-free inputs. The final cigarette bacco significantly. In the fixed price scenario, output is also a CES process using the tobacco U.S. tobacco production declines to maintain U.S. blend input and a composite (non-tobacco) input, price. However, a 10 percent decline in the reguand exhibiting constant returns to scale, assuring lated level, from 80 ppm to 72 ppm, is still nonzero profits." binding for EU cigarette manufacturers. The regulation, which only directly affects U.S. manufacturers, results in increases in EU cigarettes sold.
In 1987, the year of highest MH residues on U.S. flue-cured, the U.S. cigarette sales to Europe decline as prices rise weighted average MH residues at moisture levels consistent with cigawit i i c a w m i to rette use were 231 ppm (Sheets et al.) . requirement would increase the probability of U.S. manufacturers failing For U.S. cigarette manufacturers, the lower resto meet the MH residue regulation when using U.S. tobacco and ignoring idue limit leads to a 7.1 percent decline in the use their MH residues. Because MH residues vary across areas within the United States, U.S. manufacturers might still meet the content requirement and satisfy the MH residue regulation, although costs would increase as manufacturers must find ways to identify the low residue leaf and keep this separate for use in export cigarettes where the MH reguassuming a fixed markup i.e., a constant elasticity of demand for cigalations exist.
With increases in COStS associated
rettes, that leads to the same relative change in cigarette price and mar-' The evidence on competition in the cigarette industry is mixed.
ginal cost of cigarette production. Sullivan and Sumner find evidence of price-taking behavior. Appelbaum 7 The symbol E is used as the percentage change operator here and in and more recently Tremblay and Tremblay find evidence of market the equations given in Table 5 . Given the variable X, the notation EX = power. Market power can easily be accommodated in our model by d(lnX) = dX/X, i.e. the percentage change in X. [-a(t(a2u -. 2)](l -C)ER, (fixed price)
Quantity of the U.S. tobacco blend:
Value of the U.S. tobacco blend:
U.S. tobacco usage by U.S.
ETIU (
{ ~~~ )(P)ER, (fixed quota)
Price of U.S. tobacco in the United EPu = 0, (fixed price) States:
Non-U.S. tobacco usage by U.S.
/ \
manufacturers: 
Price of U.S. cigarettes in Europe: EPE = 0, (fixed price) of U.S. tobacco and a 12.9 percent increase in the At the tobacco-growing level, the influence of use of non-U.S. tobacco. Lower output of U.S. stricter regulations on the residues of the U.S. tocigarettes going to Europe results in higher product bacco input is negative. This is an indirect effect price, which in turn leads to an increase in EU resulting from changes in the cartel production cigarette production and the use by EU manufac-level. An 8 ppm (10% of the 80 ppm regulated turers of all inputs, including U.S. tobacco. Lower level) decrease in allowable residues in EU ciga-U.S. tobacco output indirectly leads to lower res-rettes leads to a reduction of 3.51 ppm (2.8% of idue rates due to changes in production practices (a the 125 ppm actual level) in U.S. tobacco residues. shift in the marginal cost of growing tobacco).
The percentage change in U.S. quota lease rates are positive but near zero. The high elasticity of residue level since they sell the same amount of tobacco supply at current quota levels implies little tobacco. Therefore there is no virtuous feedback change in marginal costs as quotas are reduced to effect on the residue level as there was in the case maintain a constant price. of adjustable quota. Finally, the negative effect on Column 2 of Table 6 presents the results of the the U.S. quota lease rate is much larger in this fixed quota scenario. With the fixed quota the second scenario because the price of U.S. tobacco price of U.S. tobacco adjusts downward because falls and the marginal cost of growing tobacco reof the decrease in derived demand in U.S. cigarette mains the same (no shift due to falling residue manufacturing. This price decrease stimulates di-levels). rectly exports of U.S. tobacco to the EU, induces These results are robust over a range of elasticity a decrease in EU cigarette prices, and therefore an and share values (Results of sensitivity analyses expansion of EU cigarette sales. EU tobacco use is are available upon request.) There is little change influenced by the positive scale effect and a neg-in the results if the EU demand for the U.S. cigaative substitution effect due to the lower U.S. to-rette is more elastic, i.e., as Tqc increases in absobacco price. Overall EU tobacco use decreases lute value. Not surprisingly, the only notable slightly; that is, the MH residue regulation has an changes are in the quantity of U.S. cigarettes sold. anti-protective effect on EU tobacco producers. Beyond the direct own-price effect, changes in deOther cigarette manufacturers (for non-EU final mand elasticity might have little influence in simconsumption) expand their use of U.S. tobacco ulating trade flows of inputs and outputs as residue which is stimulated by the lower U.S. price. This regulations are altered. Note also that, beyond its expansion did not arise in the adjustable quota sce-influence on manufacturers constrained by a regunario due to fixed price. lation, there are few changes associated with the In U.S. cigarette manufacturing, the regulation elasticity of the derived demand for the tobacco induces a substitution away from U.S. tobacco blend, i.e. 'j u . which is larger in the fixed quota case because
The regulation implies a divergence between the tobacco growers have no incentives to adjust the cost share of the tobacco input and its contribution
